The history of. development of human civilization is essentially a history of development of various forms of energy. Economic activities, home life, recreation, travel, in fact every kind of human activity is directly influenced by the supply, type, and price of energy. For developing countries like India, as the standard of living and urbanization increase, the growth rate in energy consumption is disproportionately higher compared to developed countries. A recent study by the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis indicates that, for each percentile increase in economic activities, there is a two percentile increase in energy use in developing countries whereas in developed countries the corresponding percentile increase is only 0.8. This would reveal clearly the sensitivity of energy in economic development. In such a growth pattern, there was an increasing reliance on oil and gas, particularly in the late fifties and sixties. Easy availability, less polluting nature, sufficiently low price, and its convenience and efficiency for transport and use had encouraged the use of oil in preference to coal which was the dominant energy resource earlier. Triggered off by the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973, the price and availability of oil dramatically changed and India, for the first time, like many other countries of the world, faced a major energy crisis. The reliance on oil was so high and the twin effects of oil crisishigher costs of production and inflation within
The data were obtained as of December 1976. the country-were so serious that a major change in energy policy was called for. The government of India announced several policies-fiscal, regulatory, and technological-to reshape the energy use pattern within the country consistent with its resources and economic objectives. In this backdrop, the recent discoveries of commercially exploitable hydrocarbon resources in Bombay High offshore region present an important opportunity in energy programming for India. This paper assesses the implications, through the year 2000, of various policy options open to the government in Bombay High.
Oil Resources and Uses
Extensive geological explorations have indicatted that there are 27 basins, on and offshore, covering roughly an area of 1.4 million square kms. where oil might be found. So far, the proven onshore reserves are 56 million tonnes in Gujarat and 72 million tonnes in Assam (Government of India, 1975) . Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), the sole central government agency set up in 1956 for exploration and production of oil, is engaged in oil exploration in the Bombay High region. In other offshore areas, groups of foreign companies have been given contracts for exploration on production sharing or fee basis. Considerable reserves have been proven in the Bombay High area (total not known as test drilling is still going on), but according to the annual report of the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals (1976) an annual production rate of 10 million tonnes can be reached by 1980 and sustained for at least 20 years. Undoubtedly, this is a conservative estimate as more reserves would be proven and the technology of offshore production would develop to produce marginal reserves from greater ocean depths. The supply of 10 million tonnes of oil products annually (both oil and associated gas in equivalent of oil tonnes) is taken as the production potential of Bombay High in this analysis. Current production from onshore wells is around 9 millions tonnes a year and this supply is expected to continue with the assumption that new onshore wells would be discovered to offset declining production from existing wells. For simplification of analysis, pre-1980 production of oil from Bombay High has been ignored as a precise estimate of this quantity is not available. This factor, however, would not affect our analysis of options.
Formulation of Options
The discovery of Bombay High provides the Government of India with four options.These are: 1) oil conservation and production from Bombay High for export: This option has been ruled out because opportunities for energy conservation through fuel substitution are very limited and the existing level of consumption itself is fairly low. No significant reduction in consumption and hence in imports would be possible for India in the near future without undue economic hardships (Henderson, 1975) . Internal needs have to be met from Bombay High, considering large imports and low possibility of other major discoveries. 2) Onshore development of resources: this option has also been ruled out as it is independent of offshore development and the import gap. The existing onshore fields are moderately declining and the new onshore discoveries are barely expected to maintain onshore production levels. 3) Development and production of Bombay High oil for internal needs: this is a feasible option, now being examined. 4) Import of an equivalent amount of oil and nondevelopment of Bombay High. This option would be the projection of present practice and hence relevant.
The last two options are mutually exclusive and exhaustive with reference to Bombay High. They also remain within the total zone of consumption and indigenous production forecasts described earlier. The analysis and evaluation of the options would essentially involve comparison of costs and benefits of the alternative policies. One cannot simply compare the costs and benefits of the option of development alone. It would be misleading because, if no decision is made, the status quo would continue into the future, producing outcomes in all possible areas of impact that would have existed under the development option. The decision is actually a choice between two alternative packages of outcomes with each package containing advantages and disadvantages. The following would be the steps in the analysis: identification of all major outcomes; prediction of outcomes with explicitly stated consumptions under each option; and evaluation of net outcomes using stated criteria in context and not in isolation. The analysis is not comprehensive in the sense it examines all policy alternatives in oil products use, pricing, or mix in relation to other energy resources. Several impacts on refining capacity, location of port and handling facilities, etc., are assumed to be common for both alternatives. The real evaluation is of the incremental impact of each alternative on Indian society. While such incremental analysis may not be available for each resource development decision because of a series of them would lead to an overall suboptimality, the decision formulation provides in this case an easy-tounderstand and feasible proposition that would lead India to near-optimal decision, within the limited zone of existing and projected use and production pattern. A more comprehensive evaluation of fundamental alternatives (restructuring oil products use through fiscal/regulatory means, breakthroughs in energy technology, massive conservation, change in lifestyle, etc.) would have to await the availability of data, resources, and political feasibility. Another major assumption behind these options is their presumed equal administrative feasibility and reasonably quick happening of events ranging from procurement of equipment, production, laying of pipes, and transportation to delivery to users.
Economic Analysis
The cost of production of Bombay High oil (which would include gas in equivalent oil tonnes) has been estimated by the author at$4.00/ barrel which would includeamortization, depreciation, and operating coats. Along with the cost of pipeline transportation of $ 0.50/barrel, the total delivered cost at Bombay would be $ 4.50/barrel. If India imports this oil from the Middle East, it would have to pay $ 11.50/barrel (December 1976 international prices) to the Middle East producer and $ 1.50/barrel for transportation by tankers, making a total of $13,00/barrel. For an annual production of 10 million tonnes, the total cost of production would be $ 283.5 million. The economic value of this oil would be (at international prices) $ 724.5 million. However, if the government decides to sell this oil internally at a lower price with subsidy (as it has been doing), that would be a separate economic decision involving such alternatives as sectoral subsidy effects on prices, financing alternate energy development, exploration, etc. This decision is independent of the source of oil. The surplus t o O N G C ( a n d h e n c e t h e g o v e r n m e n t ) would be $ 441 million (which would include royalty, fees, taxes, etc., and profits). Imports w o u l d c o s t $ 8 1 9 m i l l i o n . A d d i n g 2 5 p e r cent to this cost to reflect the real price of foreign exchange rate (not the official exchange rate between the rupee and the US dollar) the total import bill would be $ 1024 million. Such an adjustment need not be done to profits of ONGC as foreign exchange would not be involved. The projected difference between offshore surplus and import costs would increase in future as production costs would rise much more slowly than import prices. A major assumption in these estimates is that tankers and pipelines are owned and operated by the government. Tankers have alternate uses but pipelines built to carry Bombay High crude and gas do not have any alternative use. Using . 3, No. 2, April 1978 the discounted cash flow method, the net present value of the options can be calculated at an appropriate rate-social opportunity cost of capital over the lifetime of Bombay High. Such a calculation, however, has not been done as the annual differences are themselves revealing and a discounted cash flow analysis would not yield any additional insight.
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Estimation of transportation costs in this analysis has been made on the assumption that Bombay High oil would be transported by pipelines instead of tankers. Gas cannot be transported by tankers as offshore liquefaction technology does not exist. For depths of 1000 ft. and distances of 150 miles, pipeline transportation is more efficient. The location of storage facilities has no relevance to this cost analysis in comparison with the import alternative except for some land for gas processing plants and distribution network.
The impact on regional energy prices and availability would be significant. While oil would be distributed throughout the country in some equitable manner considering demand and supply, natural gas would be largely consumed within the region. The present technology of liquefaction and transportation over long distances is considerably expensive. In the foreseeable future, Bombay High gas would increase domestic gas supply in Bombay/Poona region, would reduce the demand for kerosene, and would probably be used as feedstock for fertilizer plants located in the region, and even as a fuel for power stations, freeing the supply of fuel oil and naptha, two commodities in short supply. A quantitative estimate of this impact has not been made owing to paucity of data. In addition, Bombay High oil having low sulphur content would produce more light distillates (compared to imported oil) which are relatively in short supply. Such a product-mix shift would also have economic advantages in terms of higher economic value of end-products using light distillates. This too is difficult to estimate.
The secondary and derived investment demand in the Bombay region would be considerable with this development. At a conservative estimate, about 25 per cent of the total direct capital investment ($500 million) would be triggered off by Bombay High in industries I ike repair/service, components, professional services, engineering, and equipment. This long-term investment and corresponding working capital requirements are likely to be raised primarily in the Bombay capital market and among financial institutions located in Bombay. The turnover of the financial market would increase in terms of stocks, bonds, mortgages, loans, etc. This too cannot be estimated with any precision. From this investment, the Government of Maharashtra would earn considerable tax revenues through property tax, sales tax, vehicle tax, etc.
To estimate precisely the impact on balance of payments would be a difficult task. Out of a total investment of $ 2000 million, nearly 50 per cent would be in foreign exchange (Khanna. 1976 ). All annual operating costs would be in rupees save capital replacement costs estimated annually to be $50 million. According to an IMF estimate made in 1974 during an assessment of an oil facility loan application, for every dollar of foreign exchange outflow nearly $ 0.33 tends to be returned to India by the exporting country for investment, purchase of goods and services, etc. Over a period of ten years, third party countries (in which the exporting country has spent its income earned in India) would return to India 0.25 of each dollar outflow from India through purchase of goods and services, investment, etc. (This estimate of propensity to spend by third party countries has been made by the author subjectively. A guideline was the study made by the Cabinet Task Force set up by US President on the oil import question in 1970.) Thus, over a period of ten years 85 per cent of the dollar outflow would come back to India as export earnings, but the short-term problems of foreign exchange scarcity would remain.
Based on North Sea experience, a production rate of 10 million tonnes a year would create an employment of additional direct labour of 500 and indirect additional labour of 1000 in the Bombay region. The imports option would not create any additional employment incrementally. Considering an estimate of 100,000 unemployed people in 1976 in the Bombay metropolitan region, either of the options will not have any impact in this regard. In the development option, however, second order employment in shipyards, repair/service contract business, professional/engineering services, etc., may create several hundred jobs all over India but would be difficult to estimate as of now.
Another major economic impact would be on fishing. Apart from the environmental impact on fishing which we shall examine later, fishing could decrease because of the presence of platforms, tugs, barges, tankers, and pipelines. Nearshore effects on fishing would be negligible. Fish caught would be worth about $ 30 million. As small fishermen cannot operate with catamarans at this distance from the coast, large companies (some of them multinationals) with powerful trawlers are operating in this area. Since there is currently no regulation of fishing in these waters, the companies have been indiscriminate in exploiting the fishery with the result that there is a significant reduction in certain types of fish found in this area (Central Marine Fisheries Research Station, Annual Report, 1975) . The Bombay High operations would restrict fish catching in this area to about $ 20 million (author's estimate) and thereby be a blessing in disguise to the fish in the region so that they can spawn and find havens near oil platforms, thus stabilizing fish yields over a long period of time. It is inferred that the long-term net economic impact is marginally positive but no estimates have been made.
Environmental Impact
The major environmental hazards of offshore oil production are oil spills (blowouts, accidents) originating from drilling and production and, transportation-tanker loading, shipment, and unloading and enroute in pipelines. Based on a study of oil spills between 1964 and 1973, an MIT offshore technology team estimated in 1973 that the probability of a large spill of 100,000 barrels or so (of the Santa Barbara type) is zero for an offshore operation of Bombay High size over a forty-year period (MIT, 1973) . The probability of smaller spills (two or less) of 10,000-100,000 barrels each would be 0.13. Very small spills would have no effect and hence they are ignored. Nearshore impact of these spills is also negligible (0.013). Spills from subsea pipelines are very unlikely. However, the effects of spills on marine life are of short-term duration since the most complex of hydrocarbons are eventually biodegradable. Long-term accumulating effects on the ecosystem are remote in the deep waters of Bombay High. The production and transport of gas has no adverse impact. The impact of any kind of oil spills on human life is negligible.
It has been estimated by the MIT team that, in the worst case of oil spills, up to two per cent of the fish caught might be contaminated with oil and rendered commercially unusable. Taken along with the probability of smaller spills, the joint probability of fish unusable would be 0.13x0.02=0.0026, which is sufficiently low to be ignored. If the total oil tonnage moved along the coast can be taken as a proxy for nearshore oil spills, there would be no incremental damage nearshore. In the case of imports, clearly, there would be no damage. In fact pipeline transportation is considered 40 per cent safer than tanker transportation and hence the imports option might result in more nearshore damages. There
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are varying methods to cope with oil spills: containment dispersants, and sinkings agents. With advances in technology, more effective and cheaper methods should become available over the next 15-20 years. The costs of clean up are not estimated. As nearshore impacts are negligible in a probabilistic sense, the effect on beaches, tourism, sea-based recreation and fishing, esthetic sensitivity of coastal citizens, coastal wetlands, marshes, etc., will not be considered here.
However, during the eighties, Bombay High operations many not conform to this historic pattern of spills in relation to production. There is a distinct possibility that spills may be higher owing to following reasons: pressure to produce more oil quickly to reduce the balance of payments gap; lack of experience in subsea pipeline transportation; low sensitivity to environmental quality and absence of environmental groups; absence of legal penalties or compensation for oil spills; low investment in oil spill prevention and control technology; and adverse weather conditions for about four months in a year during the monsoons. In this analysis, the influence of these negative reactions on incidence of oil spills has not been taken into account as it is not possible to quantitatively estimate their impact. Lastly, the absence of any international form of regulation of offshore reserves exploitation in economic zones is not really conducive for environmentally conscious operations. United Nations' efforts have not proved successful so far. In a mad race for higher production of oil and precious minerals, man may irreversibly damage the sensitive marine ecology of the oceans-the last frontier in our spaceship earth. From published reports and news, it does not seem that the Government of India is sensitive to these issues.
Impact on Technological Development
The technological developments which offshore development would induce in India are really remarkable (Government of India, 1974) . For a developing country, this would be a major advantage. While equipment like drilling rigs and platforms are being improved, a major indigenous development effort is underway in offshore drilling and production technology up to a depth of 1000 ft. with the development of fabrication technology, machines, and tools; subsea pipeline technology up to a distance of 100-150 miles; seismic technology for the accurate location of hydrocarbon resources; and technology of platforms, rigs, welding, and gas processing/distribution. Like the atomicenergy and space programmes, the offshore programme would trigger off many developments whose higher effects would be considerable. Sophisticated design, engineering, and fabrication facilities would be set up within the country which would generally upgrade the country's technological capabilities. Several public and private corporations are already expanding their R & D and manufacturing facilities in anticipation. Considerable efforts would also be under way to train the needed manpower directly by ONGC and by the numerous suppliers of equipment and services. Needless to mention, the option of imports would not have any of these effects. It is not possible, as of now, to quantitatively estimate the technological spinoff benefits.
Miscellaneous Impacts
The offshore operations would have adverse effect in several areas. The smooth movement of naval fleet in this security-sensitive area would be affected. No potential waste dump site or projects to generate power from tidal/wind/ocean thermal gradient can be located in this area (there have been some proposals to this effect). No seabed farming, mining, or marine research exploration can be undertaken in this region in an extensive manner. It is speculated that this region might contain extensive manganese nodules. Extensive in situ traffic controls at drilling/production sites to redirect and divert marine traffic might become necessary, having a negative effect on speed, route, time, and fuel consumption of vessels. There would be more migration of population up to 50,000 skilled people to coastal settlements in and around Bombay adding to the problems of pollution, urban blight, congestion and decline in the quality of urban life, and corresponding rural deprivity in the interior. There would be a decreased emphasis on conservation, further dependence on oil, encouragement of nonpriority uses of gas (because it cannot be transported or shared elsewhere), and delay in the development of long-term renewable energy alternatives.
There would be one positive impact of offshore development: more international cooperation is feasible in the national use of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for fishing, research, navigation, etc. There would also be challenges to maintain environmental quality and orderly use of marine resources.
Legal and Institutional Framework
The oil industry in India, right from exploration to marketing, is exclusively owned by the Government of India. In a few selected areas, exploration and production are undertaken by foreign oil companies but mostly on production sharing or fee basis. However, the private and public sectors, and the multinationals are quite active in the petrochemical industry.
The Indian government has recently declared 12 miles from the coast line as sovereign territory and 200 miles as exclusive economic zone for resource recovery and fishing. Under the existing international law of the seas, this is an acceptable practice. This authority over the coastal zone and the EEZ rests with the Union Government. The coastal states or coastal communities have no jurisdiction over offshore areas. Hence, no royalties or any share in income are payable to the local government. The Bombay High region falls within the EEZ.
The institutional framework in which oil industry in India operates is fairly simple. Under a parliamentary type of government, there is a Minister for Petroleum and Chemicals, who is a member of the cabinet. The Department of Petroleum with a permanent secretary as its head is the administrative agency within this ministry responsible for policy-making, funding, and reviewing programmes. The department is also in charge of interministerial coordination, top level appointments, etc. ONGC is an autonomous agency under the department and is responsible for Bombay High development. This Commission is comparable to TVA in the United States, operating many production wells, undertaking exploration, transportation of oil and gas (through pipelines or tankers), and storage. Another public sector company (Indian Oil Corporation) is responsible for refining and marketing operations.
The National Institute of Oceanography is a government-funded research laboratory concerned with R & D in oceanography. There is also a Central Marine Fisheries Research Station. The universities have small programmes of research relevant to offshore development. As offshore exploration is a new field, there is hardly any industry in India which has an R & D or manufacturing programme specifically related to offshore operations. However, India has a diversified industrial capability which would be of relevance to Bombay High. The government is setting up an Ocean Science and Technology Agency during the current plan for an orderly development of ocean resources.
The two other government agencies concerned actively with Bombay High are the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance. The Planning Commission is the central planning authority (notionally equivalent to GOSPLAN in USSR) which decides on overall economic goals, intersectoral and intertemporal resource allocations, and programme authorization. The Ministry of Finance (similar to the US Treasury) decides on year-to-year funds appropriation and grants procedural approvals and appropriations for expenditures within overall limits set by the Planning Commission. The Estimates Committee of Parliament and the Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Petroleum broadly approve the programme goals and outlay. The control by these committees of authorizations and appropriations is minimal. Another standing committee of Parliament-the Public Accounts Committee-is an overseeing committee which periodically evaluates the performance of ONGC.
Decisions regarding the import of oil are basically the decision of the troika consisting of the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the Reserve Bank of India. The troika acts on the advice of the Ministry of Petroleum and decides on the allocation of foreign exchange for oil import along with other competing claims for capital investment food, fertilizer, and other essential items. There is always considerable pressure on the troika to use the foreign exchange for short-term needs (e.g., food) rather than long-term developmental efforts (e.g., Bombay High). The final allocation of scarce foreign exchange is essentially a political decision decided by the cabinet after compromise at an interministerial permanent secretaries committee. At this stage it is not uncommon to find each agency advocating its own cause and programme (much like federal agencies and bureaus in US). ONGC too takes such advocacy positions from time to time, though lobbying of the kind known in US would not be realistic in the Indian situation.
Among industries, international oil companies would view the development with disfavour as they would lose the profits and the exorbitant transportation charges they used to recover when India used to import oil. However, in an expanding international market for oil products, the oil companies can always find other customers. Another set of international companies that manufacture and sell offshore drilling equipments, platforms, instrumentation, pipelines, etc., would welcome the development of Bombay High as they can sell their products to ONGC. Over the next four years, the imports for Bombay High development would amount $1 billion and thereafter annually at least $ 50 million at current estimates.
The development of Bombay High, more than the option of imports, would increase the concentration of economic power with the Central Government and increase the power of bureaucracy, technocratic elite, and upper middle classes. This resource development would not result in more equitable distribution of wealth and income. Such a complex, capital intensive, and centralized technology like offshore exploration would, in fact, accentuate inequality.
With higher indigenous production, self-reliance and minimization of vulnerability from international supply and price instabilities would result. The government's plan of building up a stockpile of 1 million tonnes can be accomplished more easily. International agencies like the World Bank and UNDP would welcome this effort as this would improve India's economic position and ability to repay external debt. (In fact the World Bank is reported to be offering $ 400 million as aid for the development of Bombay High). Such self-reliance measures would be unfavourably viewed by countries like US as being responsible for their diminishing foreign policy influence. Dependence through imports and foreign aid for imports would be a preferred approach with these nations.
If we look at regulatory agencies for offshore development, they are significantly absent. The offshore region appears to be a no-man's land. ONGC itself seems to have all regulatory powers. Oil spill containment cleanup, oil spill liability and compensation to injured parties, marine environmental quality standards, punitive procedures for offenders, equipment and construction standards-all these vital areas need specific regulations, mechanisms for prompt action, and identification of responsibility. These are woefully lacking today. In India there is no process comparable to the Environmental Impact Statement Analysis (as in US) before a development decision is made. Marine enviromental research is carried out by a number of agencies in an uncoordinated manner. There is no comprehensive law governing environmental damages. Under the existing civil law of torts, action for damage on an individual or class action basis would be possible. Court proceedings might take years and specific damages must be proven. Mere loss of scenic value, property value, etc., might not be enforceable in a court of law.
In promoting or evaluating any major project, the government's stated policy is to consider the broader environmental, social, cultural, and distributional impacts in addition to techno-economic aspects. Usually, the procedure would be to evaluate the technological feasibility and parameters, followed by an economic appraisal of the programme. The decision on scale, investment, or location of the project could well depend upon political issues like interregional rivalry. The unintended, unanticipated, synergistic, and cumulative impacts are not even discussed, let alone considered.
From this brief picture of the institutional framework, one can observe that there is fragmentation of authority, lack of coordination, and ineffectiveness. R & D programmes should be tailored to the needs of manufacturers who should be in close touch with ONGC. Financial planning and funding for all the links in this chain is a difficult task that needs to be undertaken. Accountability also seems to be low. An unnecessary degree of secrecy about information prevails in ONGC. Citizen participation in this major development effort is practically negligible. The need for passing law and establishing an independent regulatory authority is vital. Simultaneously, a public review procedure and a long-range development plan for the region should be established as guidelines to end fragmentation in regulatory and promotional efforts.
Conclusion
No attempt has been made here to weigh the outcomes and advocate the maximization of a particular outcome. An evaluation of the monetary outcomes alone would suggest the development option. The Indian government has chosen this option. A few concluding observations are noted below.
This assessment is essentially an incremental impact analysis. Though it has normative assumptions, it has not used normative procedures or a holistic framework in arriving at the results. A number of assumptions and subjecfive estimates have been made. Wherever quantitative measurement was not possible, a qualitative statement has been made. In other words, this is a conventional technology assessment (Kash etal., 1973; McAlister, 1975; Office of Technology Assessment, 1976) .
The methodology used is diverse and quantitative when felt relevant. No attempt has been made for global-type modelling efforts as the author believes that it is inappropriate and would be a hindrance in understanding the real behaviour of the system.
The assessment has attempted to be comprehensive, communicable to decision-makers, timely, and credible. Admittedly, This is the first step and a number of improvements in methodology, information base, and integration would become feasible in future. Treatment of uncertainty, interimpact effects, and value prejudices would also become possible in future through sensitivity analyses. The author believes strongly in public participation in any such decisionmaking exercise. How exactly the public would participate and how the output of such participation will be used in decision-making is not clear now. Finally, the causal relationship to the Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1978 problematic issue would become clearer and more explicit in the future.
Enough is not known about the ocean environment. While Bombay High development by itself may not result in any significant damage to the ocean, the cumulative impact of increasing, diversified, and often conflicted use of oceans in the future might result in irreversible ecological damage. Hence the need for systematic development planning for the ocean region, identification and state of priority uses, and mechanisms for control and regulation. The need for coordinated R & D, funding, and programme management can hardly be overemphasized.
Public accountability, citizen participation, and more open sharing and information are vital to mitigate the distributional effects of offshore technology.
